The nation is already in a state of unrest, and amidst this crisis, the government is poised to introduce a highly contentious bill in the assembly, seemingly crafted to benefit a particular individual while curtailing the powers vested in the Supreme Court. Such a bill, by its very nature, should be unequivocally rejected by all concerned citizens.
One of the more troubling provisions of this bill is the proposed amendment to Article 63-A of the Constitution. This amendment suggests that any vote cast by a member of Parliament in opposition to the directives of their parliamentary party on any piece of legislation or bill will nevertheless be counted.
This provision flies in the face of a seminal ruling by former Chief Justice Umar Ata Bandial. In his majority opinion on the presidential reference interpreting Article 63-A, he held that any vote cast contrary to party instructions would not only be disregarded but could also lead to the member’s disqualification from Parliament.
Any legislative attempt to counteract this decision would contravene the binding nature of the Supreme Court’s judgment and trigger enforcement of the same, ensuring that such votes remain invalid and that members voting against party lines face the prescribed consequences, including disqualification.
Moreover, the proposed bill introduces the concept of establishing a constitutional court, exclusively tasked with adjudicating constitutional matters. Concurrently, it proposes changes to the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council and the parliamentary committee responsible for judicial appointments.
This move is nothing less than an encroachment upon the Supreme Court’s constitutionally enshrined powers, undermining its authority and independence.
According to the bill, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court would be appointed by the President of Pakistan upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
For subsequent appointments, a list of three senior judges would be submitted by the Prime Minister to the National Assembly’s committee seven days before the retirement of the sitting Chief Justice.
The parliamentary committee for judicial appointments would be composed of eight members, selected by the Speaker of the National Assembly, reflective of the political composition of the House.
Under the existing legal framework, the Supreme Judicial Council is entrusted with recommending appointments to the High Courts and the Supreme Court, with final vetting by the parliamentary committee.
However, the proposed amendments undermine this process, shifting critical judicial appointment powers to a politically influenced committee, thereby endangering the principle of judicial independence.
Additionally, the bill proposes setting the retirement age for judges of the constitutional court at 68 years, with each judge serving a fixed term of three years.
Furthermore, it seeks to remove the Supreme Court’s power of suo motu jurisdiction, a critical tool for upholding the rule of law and ensuring checks and balances.
Another alarming provision is the proposal to allow the transfer of judges from one High Court to another, a move that would further erode judicial independence and threaten the impartiality of the judiciary.
